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COMMENT
GOODBYE TO GOOD BIRD: CONSIDERING THE USE OF
CONTACT AGREEMENTS TO SETTLE CONTESTED ADOP-
TIONS ARISING UNDER THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
RONALD M. WALTERS1
I. INTRODUCTION
After two years of heated litigation, settling Christian Good Bird’s
contested adoption outside of the courtroom must have relieved his biologi-
cal mother, tribe and adoptive parents, but the decision almost certainly
generated feelings of uncertainty about what long-term effects the compro-
mise would have on Christian as well.2 Indeed, Christian’s long-term suc-
cess will be of great significance for those concerned with Indian3 child
1. University of St. Thomas, JD expected 2010; University of Wisconsin-Madison, BA
2006.  Essential and much-appreciated support for this research project came from the Minnesota
Justice Foundation, the ICWA Law Center, and Faegre and Benson, LLP. Special thanks to the
staff at Schoenecker Law Library at the University of St. Thomas for their help and patience and
to Mara Koeller for her assistance in editing.
2. I first learned about Christian’s case while volunteering at the ICWA Law Center in
Minneapolis and working on a separate but very similar contested adoption. It seems fitting to
begin with Christian’s story mostly because his case eventually settled with the aid of a contact
agreement, but also because his case received national media exposure. Christian’s adoptive par-
ents appeared on Dr. Phil after a judge had ordered them to return Christian to his mother in 45
days. Dr. Phil: Adoption Controversy (CBS television broadcast Jan. 28, 2005) (transcript on file
with the author). While the Hofers were still expecting that they would have to return Christian,
Dr. Phil suggested that the situation might best be resolved extrajudicially. Id. at 20. The litigation
settled soon thereafter.
3. Different terms are used throughout this paper to represent the peoples that populated
North America, Australia, and New Zealand before European colonization. In order to minimize
confusion, I have largely deferred to the terms used by the authors I have cited. For example, I use
the word “Indian” in the third sentence because, in this context, it refers indirectly to the Indian
Child Welfare Act. Otherwise, when the words “aboriginal” and “indigenous” are used without
capitalization, they refer to pre-colonial peoples generally.  When the word “Aboriginal” is capi-
talized, it refers to pre-colonial peoples from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. The terms
“Native American” and “Indian” are used interchangeably in reference to pre-colonial people
from what is now called the United States. I realize that not everyone believes that these two
words are equivalent in terms of the values they connote, and I apologize in advance to anyone
who would take issue with my use of either of them. Whenever possible, I try to use the name of
the particular tribe being discussed. Additionally, the U.S. Census includes the separate term
“Alaska Native” in its racial classification of Native Americans; this term has been incorporated
where appropriate.
270
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welfare issues because the settlement of his case was facilitated by a recent
development in adoption law whose efficacy has yet to be fully determined.
Christian’s mother, Juanita Good Bird, is an enrolled member of the
federally-recognized4 Three Affiliated Tribes of the Berthold Reservation in
northwestern North Dakota.5 She met Shannon and Bonnie Hofer, a white
couple from Hendricks, Minnesota, through mutual friends from her
church.6 When Juanita decided that she could no longer take care of Chris-
tian, she met with the Hofers and asked them to raise her son.7 The Hofers
accepted and Juanita signed paperwork with an attorney, believing that she
was terminating her parental rights to Christian.8 The adoption was still
pending when, after two years of living without her son, Juanita attempted
to regain custody.9 Unsurprisingly, the Hofers did not want to let Christian
go.10 The conflict soon escalated into a tense legal battle. Because of Chris-
tian’s relationship with the Three Affiliated Tribes, the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act (hereinafter “ICWA” or “the Act”), a federal law governing
“Indian child custody proceedings,”11 applied to and shaped, but did not
ultimately control, the results of the litigation.12
The Indian Child Welfare Act effectively barred the Hofers from
adopting Christian. ICWA requires that when a parent voluntarily termi-
nates his or her rights to their Indian child, such “consent shall not be valid
unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.”13 Because Juanita signed the termination papers in an at-
torney’s office rather than before a judge, her parental rights remained
intact. Moreover, ICWA prohibits, apart from “good cause to the contrary,”
adoptions of Indian children by non-Indians.14 “Good cause” has been inter-
preted differently in different states, but guidelines issued by the Bureau of
4. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,331 (July 12, 2002).
5. Cultural Connectedness Agreement, Three Affiliated Tribes, (Dec. 27, 2005) (on file
with the ICWA Law Center, Minneapolis, MN).
6. Letter from Bonnie Hofer to Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare (Jan. 10, 2006),
available at http://www.caicw.org/hope.html#Hofer.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Dr. Phil, supra note 2, at 16.
10. Id.
11. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1978).
12. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (1978).  ICWA’s authority is derived from Indian tribes’ status
as “distinct sovereign nations.” See Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-
Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT.  L.
REV. 1, 3 (1993). ICWA is premised on the belief that “there is no resource that is more vital to
the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.” 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)
(1978) (emphasis added). While ICWA has been attacked for being racially-based, this criticism
gives insufficient weight to the history and complexity of Indian identity. See generally Carole
Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373 (2002).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1978).
14. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1978) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State
law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with
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Indian Affairs (BIA) suggest departing from the ICWA’s preference for In-
dian families only in accordance with the request of the biological parents,
the child’s extraordinary needs, or a lack of suitable families.15 In Minne-
sota, where Christian’s adoption was filed, the courts have adopted the
BIA’s suggestions for defining “good cause.”16 Because Christian’s mother
opposed adoption by the Hofers, and because Christian had no extraordi-
nary needs and his Tribe had other placements available, the Hofers were
not eligible to adopt Christian under ICWA. Despite the fact that the law
was not on their side, the Hofers pressed on, in hopes of keeping Christian.
After the Three Affiliated Tribes intervened on Christian’s behalf17
and after two years of fighting, the parties settled out of court by signing a
“Cultural Connectedness Agreement.”18 In return for Juanita and the
Tribes’ consent to adoption outside ICWA’s preferences, the Agreement
obligated the Hofers “to establish and maintain contact with [Christian’s]
Tribal culture and his extended family.”19 Similar agreements (generally
termed “post-adoption contact agreements”) have typically been used to
regulate cooperative parenting between biological family members and
adoptive parents within open adoption scenarios.20
This paper attempts to answer whether using such agreements to settle
disputed, non-ICWA-compliant adoptions of Indian children will have suf-
ficiently comparable effects to adoptions within ICWA’s preferences. Can
contact agreements offer sufficient protection to the two interests Congress
intended the Act to defend: “the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and
the rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its
(1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3)
other Indian families.”).
15. See id. The guidelines issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs offer further interpretation
of ICWA and serve as a guide to state courts in settling Indian child-custody matters. See Guide-
lines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,595 (Nov. 26,
1979) (stating that “good cause” to depart from the ICWA placement preferences will be based on
at least one of the following three considerations: either (1) “the request of the biological parents
or the child when the child is of sufficient age”; (2) “the extraordinary physical or emotional needs
of the child as established by testimony of a qualified expert witness”; or (3) “the unavailability of
suitable families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the
preference criteria”). Other states have defined “good cause” differently. See Erik W. Aamot-
Snapp, When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of Discretion: Eliminating the “Good Cause”
Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act Adoptive Placements, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1167, 1178–93
(1995).
16. In re S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 1994).
17. ICWA also grants Indian tribes the right to intervene “[i]n any State court proceeding for
the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child.” 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c) (1978).
18. Three Affiliated Tribes, supra note 5.
19. Id.
20. See Annette R. Appell, Increasing Options to Improve Permanency: Considerations in
Drafting an Adoption with Contact Statute, 18 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 24, n.2 (1998) (defining open
adoption as “a broad and flexible concept encompassing a spectrum of relationships that range
from preadoption exchange of information among the birth and adoptive parents to ongoing pos-
tadoption contact between the birth family and the adoptive family.”).
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society”?21 When viewed in light of the historical record regarding colonial
and indigenous relations and the research regarding the development of in-
digenous identity, contact agreements are generally an inadequate substitute
for adoption within ICWA’s preferences. Furthermore, endorsement of their
use could create an undesirable method for avoiding enforcement of the
Act.
This paper addresses three groups of people: (1) Indian tribes consider-
ing the use of contact agreements to settle contested adoptions under
ICWA; (2) lawyers who counsel and advise those tribes; and (3) well-in-
tending foster parents who seek to adopt Native American children and are
perplexed by ICWA’s determination that they are usually ineligible.22 First,
this paper will contextualize the use of contact agreements under ICWA
within the history of assimilationist policies towards indigenous peoples.
Second, this paper will discuss ICWA and modern trends in enforcing the
Act. Third, this paper will analyze the use of contact agreements in light of
the first two sections. Lastly, this paper will conclude by identifying several
principles that should foster successful contact agreements and by recom-
mending to increase the education of child welfare workers about the im-
portance of ICWA in order to increase compliance with the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
Early Attempts to Promote the Best Interests of Indigenous Children
Most legal opinions and academic articles written about ICWA fail to
contextualize the Act within broader historical trends in indigenous-colonial
relations and limit their introduction of the law and the reasons for its pas-
sage to citing the congressional findings laid out in the opening lines of the
Act.23 Part of this tendency can be attributed to Congress’s shortsightedness
21. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978).
22. While I am an ardent ICWA supporter, I also recognize that to those would-be adoptive
parents who find their efforts to adopt Indian children frustrated, ICWA can seem like a bizarre
legal loophole or an outdated race-based policy that unfairly discriminates against whites. A re-
cent editorial expressed this common aggravation this way: “The Indian Child Welfare Act’s
original goal was to combat abusive practices that took Indian children from tribal communities
and put them in unfamiliar environments with strangers . . . . But today, the reverse is happening.
Children who never have been near a reservation are being removed from environments they love
and forced to live with strangers chosen by tribes.” Lisa Morris, Editorial, Law Could Tear Chil-
dren from a “Tribe” They Love, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Mar. 27, 2007. Ms. Morris is the admin-
istrator of the Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare, a group whose website compiles
“letters from familes [sic] hurt by ICWA,” many of whom have very understandable grievances.
See Letters from Familes Hurt by ICWA, http://www.caicw.org/familystories.html. It is my hope
that this article will help shed some light on why the ICWA is still relevant and necessary in order
to relieve some of that frustration.
23. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32, 35 (1989); Matter of
Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 965 (Utah 1986). See generally In re A.W., 741 N.W.2d
793 (Iowa 2007); Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419 (1998); Alan J. DeGarmo, The Indian
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when it was investigating the child welfare abuses that gave rise to ICWA.
The hearings that preceded the passage of ICWA are replete with statistics
and stories about then-current abuses, but they contain little history of the
government-sponsored assimilationist policies that laid the foundation for
future problems.24 Congress’s emphasis on statistical evidence of problems
within the Indian child welfare system became codified in the text of the
Act and few legal authorities have attempted to expand justification for
ICWA beyond these relatively narrow, circumstantial grounds.25
Ignoring ICWA’s historical context creates several problems. First, it
encourages resistance to ICWA by preventing the public from understand-
ing how extensive the abuse of indigenous children has been and the reper-
cussions it has had on Indian tribes.26 Second, it ignores the fact that much
of the abuse of Native American children has been done with their “best
interests” at heart and thereby misleads people into believing that a tradi-
tional “best interests” analysis is the best tool for making decisions about
Indian child welfare.27 Third, it does little to allow for important new justi-
fications for enforcing ICWA.28 Since these issues contribute to contested
adoptions of Native American children, it is worth going into some detail
about this aspect of history.
Child Welfare Act: Its Impact on Unknowing Adoptive Parents, 17 J. JUV. L. 32 (1996); Hon.
Maurice Portley, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Primer, 36 ARIZ. ATT’Y 24 (2000).
24. See Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974) [hereinafter “ICWA
Hearing”] (statement of Sen. James Abourezk, Member, Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs).
25. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978) (“Recognizing the special relationship between the United
States and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people, the
Congress finds . . . that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the
removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies
and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adop-
tive homes and institutions.” (emphasis added)).
26. In fact, taking ICWA’s legislative history out of context allowed the creation of one of
ICWA’s greatest threats—the “existing Indian family” doctrine—which will be discussed in more
detail below. When the Kansas Supreme Court first created the doctrine and determined that it
was free to limit application of ICWA without mention of such limitations anywhere in the Act’s
plain language, it did so based on “[a] careful study of the legislative history behind the Act.”
Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982).
27. See Aamot-Snapp, supra note 15, at 1181–82 (“The child’s best interests . . . and the
parent’s placement preferences frequently comprise part of the good cause analysis of state courts
in ICWA adoptive placement proceedings . . . . State courts persistently evaluate Native American
children’s best interests by considering what courts perceive as their needs for permanent place-
ment and psychological attachment.  Majority culture values, however, permeate these good cause
factors.”). Though the ICWA itself presumes that following its preferences is in “the best interests
of Indian children,” the language in the Act is not so unequivocal as to prevent state courts from
employing traditional “best interests” analyses. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
28. For example, because many indigenous languages, “unique tool[s] for analyzing and syn-
thesizing the world [and] incorporating the knowledge and values of a speech community,” are in
rapid rates of decline, preserving cultural distinctiveness may become even more important to
Indian tribes. James Crawford, Endangered Native American Languages: What Is to be Done, and
Why? 19 BILINGUAL RES. J. 17, 33 (1995).
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England provides a viable starting point for understanding the Indian
history in America, not only because it dominated the most “New World”
territory among European colonial powers, but also because its methodol-
ogy for doing so featured two phenomena also seen in America: the use of
boarding schools to assimilate Indians into the mainstream, and the belief
that doing so was for their own good.29As the British Empire continued to
expand, the 1837 House of Commons Select Committee on Aborigines was
charged with “establishing an appropriate social policy for the continuing
process of contact and consolidation [with indigenous people].”30 In craft-
ing its policies regarding aboriginal peoples in Canada, Australia, and even-
tually New Zealand, the English government drew from the newest ideas
and methods employed with its domestic indigent population.31 The report
of the Select Committee on Aborigines included an “assumption that the
purpose of the policy was to bring ‘outsiders,’ whether the poor or
aboriginals, within the established institutions of British society and, partic-
ularly, the wage economy.”32 Also noted was the “special recognition for
the situation of children, who were considered particularly open to change,
education, and salvation.”33
In order to prepare them for “the responsibilities of Christianity, civili-
zation, and British citizenship,” Australian and Canadian aboriginal chil-
dren were separated from their parents and placed in large specialized
institutions.34
These institutions, in the form of dormitories (Australia) and resi-
dential schools (Canada), segregated the children from their par-
ents, from their peers of opposite gender, and from their younger
and older siblings. The use of English was enforced, and aborigi-
nal languages were suppressed through the extensive use of cor-
poral punishment and various forms of humiliation. The
institutions were expected to use the labour of the children to re-
duce their operating expenses to the lowest possible level. This
objective was given precedence over the educational objective,
with the result that the children spent most of their time providing
manual farm labour, cutting wood, baking bread, cooking, and
making clothes. The level of educational achievement was
29. ANDREW ARMITAGE, COMPARING THE POLICY OF ABORIGINAL ASSIMILATION: AUSTRA-
LIA, CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND 3 (1995).
30. Id. at 4. The Select Committee was “appointed to consider what measures ought to be
adopted with regard to the Native Inhabitants of Countries where British Settlements are made,
and to the neighbouring Tribes, in order to secure for them the due observance of Justice and the
protection of their Rights: to promote the spread of civilization among them, and to lead them to
the peaceable and voluntary reception of the Christian religion.” Id. at 243 n.2.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. ARMITAGE, supra note 29, at 243.
34. Id. at 204.
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low . . . [and] the children were deprived of the opportunity to
learn their own aboriginal culture and its technologies.35
These schools were based on a “paternalistic ‘save the child’ philoso-
phy” aimed at rescuing Aboriginal children from less-civilized and non-
white cultures.36 They were not shut down until the 1970s, after the conclu-
sion that these deliberate social engineering projects failed to produce ex-
pected results and new strategies of integrating Aboriginal social policy
within mainstream policy arose.37 Though the objective was still assimila-
tion, Canadian and Australian Aboriginals were finally granted citizenship
and the right to vote, and mainstream services were expanded to include
Aboriginal peoples.38
Assimilationist Policies Come to the United States
The history of the United States’ relationship with its indigenous peo-
ples, and in particular, their children, is frighteningly similar to the histories
of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In the United States, as in the other
English colonies, “education offered the perfect opportunity to completely
indoctrinate the Indian children in the white man’s ways.”39 The differences
in Indian family structure, gender roles, sexual and romantic mores, systems
of property ownership, work ethic, housekeeping, and religion conflicted
with white ideals and gave rise to policies that “reflected a determined ef-
fort to reshape the Native American family into the nineteenth-century An-
glo-American model.”40 Just as English policy on aboriginal people was
derived from policies focused on dealing with a poor population “outside
the accepted economic structure [who were,] or could become[,] a source of
disorder,”41American assimilation efforts were especially preoccupied with
combating the Indians’ “lacking in industry,”42and “dearth of capital.”43
Assimilationist policies took several forms, all aimed at changing the
Native American: divestment of community-held tribal land and redistribu-
tion to individual tribal members, religious conversion, regulation of famil-
ial behaviors and gender roles, and perhaps most importantly to child
35. Id. at 205, 208.
36. Id. at 209.
37. Id. at 191, 192. See also Ian Austen, Canada Offers an Apology for Native Students’
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/ameri-
cas/12canada.html?_r=1&oref=login; Tim Johnston, Australia Says ‘Sorry’ to Aborigines for Mis-
treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/world/
asia/13aborigine.html.
38. ARMITAGE, supra note 29, at 191–92.
39. Linda J. Lacey, The White Man’s Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimila-
tion Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 356 (1986).
40. Id. at 329.
41. ARMITAGE, supra note 29, at 4.
42. FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS
240 (1984).
43. Id.
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welfare policies, the establishment of schools for the indoctrination of In-
dian children into mainstream culture.44 Deyhle and Swisher argue,
[P]erhaps the most visible symbol of the assimilatory strategies
and goals of the dominant society was the development of the
boarding school system.  The idea was that the best way for Indi-
ans to become Americans was to remove their children as far as
possible from the influences of their homes, families, and
culture.45
Captain Richard Pratt, who founded the Carlisle Indian Boarding School,
distilled this philosophy into a concise slogan dripping with cultural con-
ceit: “Kill the Indian to Save the Man.”46
The first Indian boarding schools were established by missionaries in
the 1600s.47  The boarding school approach to assimilation through educa-
tion, “gained wide support during the 1700s and flourished in the 1800s
when the federal government increased its involvement and responsibility
by developing an educational system for American Indians.”48By 1895, the
federal government was supporting over two hundred schools serving more
than eighteen thousand Indian students.49Like their Australian and Cana-
dian counterparts, boarding schools were hoped to be “the solution to the
Indian problem” since they attempted to facilitate “rapid assimilation of the
race into American life.”50The children at these boarding schools were only
allowed to speak English and could be severely punished for speaking in
their native tongue.51The students “were also required to wear white man’s
clothing, cut their hair short, and pay strict attention to personal cleanli-
ness.”52 The schools taught white gender roles: boys farmed, worked with
tools, and learned trades; girls cleaned, sewed, and ironed.53In many
schools, the passage of the Dawes Act,54 a piece of legislation that divested
tribes of community-held land and redistributed it to individual tribal mem-
44. HOXIE, supra note 42, at 241–42.
45. Donna Deyhle & Karen Swisher, Research in American Indian and Alaska Native Edu-
cation: From Assimilation to Self-Determination, 22 REV. RES. EDUC. 113, 115 (1997).
46. Lacey, supra note 39, at 356 (“Pratt’s vision of Indian education was simple and unyield-
ing: the Indian child had to be completely separated from tribal ways and totally assimilated into
Anglo-American culture.”). See also DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION:
AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928 19 (1995) (“Where In-
dians were concerned, ‘a good school may thus bridge over for them the dreary chasm of a thou-
sand years of tedious evolution.’ Thus, schools could not only civilize, they could civilize in
record time.”).
47. Deyhle & Swisher, supra note 45, at 114.
48. Id.
49. HOXIE, supra note 42, at 189, 190.
50. ADAMS, supra note 46, at 52.
51. Lacey, supra note 39, at 357.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 357–58.
54. Indian General Allotment Act (Dawes Act (Indians)) (General Allotment Act) (GAA),
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331–334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354,
and 381 (2000)).
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bers in hopes of encouraging Indians to forsake communal tribal life and
embrace individualism,55 was celebrated as a national holiday.56According
to Linda Lacey, “[p]hysical conditions in many boarding schools were
deplorable. . . . Indian children were constantly taught that their way of life
was savage and barbaric, resulting in severe loss of esteem.”57
By the early 1900s, even the champions of the boarding school move-
ment were ready to acknowledge that “the nation’s Indian policy was a
miserable failure. . . . [R]eformers had clearly expected too much of the off-
reservation school.”58The boarding schools began to be replaced by on-res-
ervation day schools, though some continued until the 1950s with a
changed purpose.59The remaining boarding schools “became residential fa-
cilities for Native American children found to be dependent and/or ne-
glected.”60 The end of the boarding school movement, however, was not
nearly the end of policies designed to assimilate the Indians.
A Limited Number of Adoptable Children Increases Demand for Native
American Children
After the boarding schools closed, the Bureau of Indian Affairs “be-
came concerned about the number of [Indian] children that would be re-
turned to a life of poverty if placements were not found.”61Still hoping that
an immersion in white culture could transform Indian children, “the BIA
hired social workers to place Native American children in long-term care
with non-Native families.”62The Indian Adoption Project, which ran be-
tween 1958 and 1967, signaled an important new era in Indian child welfare
policy. The project was a collaboration between the BIA and the Child Wel-
fare League of America and was designed to remove Indian children from
55. Lacey, supra note 39, at 350. (“The most important aspect of the assimilationist strategy
was the divestment of community-held tribal land and the corresponding allotment of a parcel
land to each tribal member.  Reformers believed that land allotment would accomplish a number
of desirable goals. First, it would completely destroy the tribal system by reducing tribal power of
individual Indians. Second, policy-makers believed that individual ownership of land would instill
the proper respect for property, both real and personal, in the Indian. This respect would en-
courage him to work harder, accept Christianity, and become a family man in every way. Third,
once he became a landowner, the Indian would no longer lead a nomadic life, but would build a
permanent residence on his property. He would become a farmer, his wife would learn the skills
necessary to support this new way of life, and he would happily educate his children in the white
man’s ways.”).
56. Id. at 358.
57. Id. at 360–61.
58. ADAMS, supra note 46, at 307.
59. Lacey, supra note 39, at 360–61; LILA J. GEORGE, Why the Need for the Indian Child
Welfare Act?, in THE CHALLENGE OF PERMANENCY PLANNING IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 165,
168 (Gary R. Anderson, Angela Shen Ryan, & Bogart R. Leashore eds., 1997).
60. Id. at 168.
61. Id. at 168–69.
62. Id. at 169.
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their families in an effort to integrate them into mainstream society.63
Though the Indian Adoption Project was a continuation of assimilationist
policy, it was also symptomatic of an emergent interest of white couples in
transracial adoptees.64 The availability of reliable birth control, legal abor-
tion, and increased social acceptability of parenting outside marriage re-
sulted in significantly fewer healthy, white children available for
adoption.65Along with the Indian Adoption Project, the decrease in the
number of adoptable white children also encouraged an increase in the
adoption of African American children by white families. The practice was
once looked down upon, but “the number of such adoptions grew in the
1960s and 1970s, initiated by the decline in the number of White babies
available for adoption and the Civil Rights Movement’s call for integra-
tion. . . .”66 Since the Indian Adoption Project, assimilationist policies have
coexisted with an elevated demand for adoptable children in a convoluted
and often inseparable fashion.
Congress Responds to the Problems Facing Native American Children
Even after the Indian Adoption Project ended,67 “most public and pri-
vate welfare agencies seem to have operated on the premise that most In-
dian children would really be better growing up non-Indian.”68During the
early 1970s, Indian children were removed from their homes at rates vary-
ing from five to twenty-five times higher than non-Indians.69Yvette Melan-
son’s story is similar to many from this period: as one of two newborn
Navajo twins born on the reservation, she was taken to a hospital when she
suddenly became ill.70The hospital staff presumed that her family was inca-
63. Id.
64. See Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, 3 ADOPTION 104, 107
(1993) (“In 1967, a national survey disclosed that of 696 Native American children who had been
adopted, 84% (584) had been adopted by white families.”).
65. Harold D. Grotevant, Nora Dunbar, Julie K. Kohler, & Amy M. Lash Esau, Adoptive
Identity: How Contexts Within and Beyond the Family Shape Developmental Pathways, 49 FAM-
ILY RELATIONS 379, 380 (2000); see Kathy P. Zamostny, Karen M. O’Brien, Amanda L. Baden &
Mary O’Leary Wiley, The Practice of Adoption: History, Trends, and Social Context, 31 COUN-
SELING PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 653 (2003).
66. Grotevant et al., supra note 65, at 381.
67. In 2001, Shay Bilchik, current President and CEO of the Child Welfare League, offered
an official apology for the Indian Adoption Project, calling it “narrow-minded thinking” and
something “very hurtful to those children and their families.” Associated Press, Indian Adoption
Project Seeks ‘Lost Birds’; Tough Choices: Years Later, Apologies Are Finally Coming to Tribes,
TELEGRAPH–HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), July 1, 2001, at A5.
68. ICWA Hearing, supra note 24, at 1–2 (1974).
69. Id. at 1.
70. See YVETTE MELANSON WITH CLAIRE SAFRAN, LOOKING FOR LOST BIRD: A JEWISH WO-
MAN DISCOVERS HER NAVAJO ROOTS (1999).
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pable of caring for her, and stole her and her perfectly healthy twin brother
away to be adopted by a rich, Jewish family.71
By 1974, the latest phase of the Indian child welfare crisis came to the
attention of Congress through a freshman senator from South Dakota. Sena-
tor James Abourezk was one of only fourteen Lebanese-Americans in South
Dakota at that time.72His sympathy for the plight of Indian children may
have come from his birth on a Sioux reservation as well his involvement as
a spokesman for another disenfranchised people: Arabs in Israel.73Whatever
the case, this unlikely champion of Indian child welfare persuaded Congress
to hold hearings in 1974 that uncovered gross injustices in the child welfare
system.  During two days in April, Congress heard from officials from the
BIA, tribal leaders, child psychologists, heads of Indian service providers
(including the Indian Health Service and the Association on American In-
dian Affairs) and mothers who had been personally affected by the Indian
child welfare crisis.74 Their testimony centered on appalling statistics re-
garding the overrepresentation of Indian children in foster and adoptive care
and first-hand accounts of child theft by misguided social workers.75 Ulti-
mately, in passing the Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress determined that
“nontribal public and private agencies” were responsible for the breakup of
the Indian family, and that state authorities, “through administrative and
judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations
of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families.”76
The Act granted numerous procedural and substantive protections to
Native American families that were designed “to protect the best interests
of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families.”77ICWA has been called “a success with regard to its goal of
giving Indian tribes more power over their members in general [and] over
their children in particular.”78There is good reason, however, to qualify
statements about ICWA’s success. Thirty years after the passage of ICWA,
overrepresentation of Indian children in foster care—one of the principal
71. See id. When Yvette discovered her Navajo heritage as an adult, she underwent a difficult
but rewarding journey towards reconnecting with her family and tribe. Her book is the story of the
struggle and rewards that came from moving her family back to the Navajo reservation in order to
regain her identity.
72. 200 Faces for the Future, TIME, Jul. 15, 1974, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,879402-2,00.html.
73. See JAMES G. ABOUREZK, ADVISE AND DISSENT: MEMOIRS OF SOUTH DAKOTA AND THE
U.S. SENATE 9–10, 243–58 (1989).
74. ICWA Hearing, supra note 24, at 1–2.
75. Id.
76. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4), (5) (1978).
77. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
78. Christine Basic, An Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 16 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 345, 349 (2007).
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impetuses for passing the Act—remains a huge problem.79In Alaska and
South Dakota, for example, over sixty percent of Native American children
are in foster care.80 Unfortunately, there is a recent trend towards subverting
the Act through a judicially-made exception to its application and abuse of
one of the Act’s discretionary provisions.81This will be discussed in more
detail below.
Towards a Theory of Transracial Adoption of Indigenous Children
At the same time as the interest in transracial adoption was increasing
in the United States, a similar phenomenon arose in Canada. Now termed
the “Sixties Scoop,” Canada experienced the same disproportionate repre-
sentation of indigenous children in foster care,82 as well as “notable in-
creases in Aboriginal child apprehensions” leading to adoption.83 Also
similar to the scenario in the United States, the “Sixties Scoop” was not a
specific child welfare program or policy.84 Yet, the Canadian experience
differs from the American experience in three important respects: official
response to the problem came later, was more progressive, and suggested
new explanations for problems with transracial adoption among indigenous
children.
Canada’s response to the indigenous child welfare crisis commenced
ten years after Senator Abourezk initiated the hearings that preceded ICWA
in the United States and occurred on a provincial (as opposed to national)
basis. In 1985, Justice E. Kimmelman led a judicial review of Aboriginal
adoption in the province of Manitoba that resulted in a moratorium on Ab-
original adoption.85Afterwards, “other Canadian provinces followed suit
and long-term foster care has been the norm in most provinces since that
time.”86
Canada’s response to the “Sixties Scoop” has also been more progres-
sive than that of the United States. Canada’s government officially apolo-
gized for their treatment of indigenous children.87Additionally, provinces
such as Manitoba have instituted repatriation programs intended to recon-
79. See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-290, INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE ACT: EXISTING INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD BE USED TO
TARGET GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO STATES 13 tbl.3 (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter “GAO”] (report-
ing that 62% of children served by the Alaska foster care system, 61% of the children served by
the South Dakota foster care system, and 35% of the children served by the Montana foster care
system are Native American).
80. Id.
81. See Aamot-Snapp, supra note 15, at 1170; Metteer, supra note 23, at 420–21.
82. ARMITAGE, supra note 29, at 118.
83. Raven Sinclair, Identity Lost and Found: Lessons from the Sixties Scoop, 3 FIRST PEO-
PLES CHILD & FAM. REV. 65, 66 (2007).
84. Id. at 66–67.
85. Id. at 68.
86. Id.
87. Austen, supra note 37.
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nect children lost in the “Sixties Scoop” with their indigenous
communities.88
Lastly, and most importantly, a group of Canadian scholars have be-
gun to offer findings that complicate the previously existing consensus that
transracial adoption leads to consistently positive outcomes. Scholars in the
U.S., including Richard M. Lee from the University of Minnesota, have
concluded that transracial adoption generally does not place adoptees at a
higher risk for emotional and behavior problems.89 However, that finding
has been challenged by a small but growing body of empirical evidence
showing that transracial adoption has surprisingly negative effects upon in-
digenous children.90 Canadian scholars found that transracial adoption pro-
duces negative outcomes for indigenous children and based these findings
on two sources: studies showing that adjustment to adoption in Aboriginal
children deteriorates as the children get older91 and case studies revealing
frequent and similar types of identity problems among groups of indigenous
adoptees.
In what could be called the seminal hypothesis of the Canadian case
studies, Carol Locust’s pilot study of twenty Aboriginal Canadian adoptees
posited that “the cluster of long-term psychological liabilities exhibited by
American Indian adults who experienced non-Indian placement as children
may be recognized as a syndrome.”92 Locust coined the term “Split Feather
Syndrome” to represent the psychological problems experienced by
nineteen of the twenty subjects she interviewed. The subjects of Locust’s
study identified the loss of Indian identity, family, culture, heritage, lan-
guage, spiritual beliefs, tribal affiliation, and tribal ceremonial experiences
as major contributors to the development of their problems.93
While the small sample size of Locust’s study and dearth of empirical
studies on this subject are not enough to prove Locust’s hypothesis outright,
her argument finds support from a host of theoretical sources.94 Contempo-
rary literature on social sciences, psychology and race theory suggests that
88. See generally BENNETT & CYR RESEARCH AND CONSULTING, FINAL REPORT: EVALUA-
TION OF THE MANITOBA FIRST NATIONS REPATRIATION PROGRAM (Jan. 11, 2001) (on file with
author).
89. Richard M. Lee, The Transracial Adoption Paradox: History, Research, and Counseling
Implications of Cultural Socialization, 31 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 711, 716 (2003).
90. Though the research suggesting that indigenous children experience unique problems in
adoption is substantial, almost all of the reviewed sources note that more research is needed.
91. Sinclair, supra note 83, at 65. Statistics referenced indicate the rate is as high as 95% for
adoptees in their mid-teens.
92. Carol Locust, Split Feathers . . . Adult American Indians Who Were Placed in Non-
Indian Families as Children, 44 ONTARIO ASS’N OF CHILD. AID SOC. J. 11, 11 (2000).
93. Id.
94. Sinclair, supra note 83, at 71 (“The lack of literature in the area of Aboriginal adoption
means that to this point we rely largely on common knowledge in order to influence policy and
develop programs for adoptees.  There are some answers to be gleaned from contemporary litera-
ture in the social sciences, particularly psychology and race theory, as to why transracial adoption
of Aboriginal children, in particular, is problematic.”).
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growing up racially Native American in white culture inhibits the develop-
ment of a Native American identity to a degree that prohibits adults from
ever recovering it—much to their detriment. Moreover, the literature shows
that the methods usually employed to overcome this problem are incapable
of working.
Though the U.S. Census now recognizes American Indians and Alaska
Natives as a distinct racial group,95 “racial identity is a new construct for
American Indians, who have historically identified as distinct tribes.”96 In-
dian identity was complex even before an inclusive racial identity was
available.97  A Native American may have various levels of identity to
choose from: “sub-tribal (clan, lineage, traditional), tribal (ethnographic or
linguistic, reservation-based, official), regional (Oklahoma, California,
Alaska, Plains), supra-tribal or pan-Indian (Native American, Indian, Amer-
ican Indian).”98 The ability of a Native American to successfully embrace
any of these identities is contingent upon the “extent to which the individual
uses the signs, symbols, and language of the culture associated with that
particular membership group.”99 These signs, or “minimum membership
credentials,” are acquired by birth and a long period of socialization.100
This poses a real obstacle for racial Native Americans without meaningful
ties to other Native Americans, and who often encounter social resistance to
their membership in both groups.101 Looking Caucasian or having little
knowledge of tribal culture may prevent one from being accepted by the
Indian community he or she wishes to be a part of.102 At the same time,
appearing Indian can prevent participation in mainstream white culture due
to resistance on the part of white people.103 This conflict among transracial
95. U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in Census 2000 and Beyond,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2008).
96. Alexandra R. Pierce, American Indian Identity Formation: The Importance of Tribe and
Culture (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
97. See Nicholas C. Peroff, Indian Identity, 34 SOC. SCI. J. 485, 486 (1997) (“Indianness
means different things to different people.  And, of course, at the most elementary level, Indian-
ness is something only experienced by people who are Indians.  It is how Indians think about
themselves and is internal, intangible, and metaphysical. From this perspective, studying Indian-
ness is like trying to study the innermost mysteries of the human mind itself.”).
98. Joane Nagel, Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Cul-
ture, 41 SOC. PROBLEMS (SPECIAL ISSUE ON IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA)
152, 155 (1994).
99. Elsie J. Smith, Ethnic Identity Development: Toward the Development of a Theory Within
the Context of Majority/Minority Status, 70 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 181, 182 (1991).
100. Id. at 185 (“[E]ach ethnic group establishes minimal signs, symbols, and guidelines that
indicate an allegiance to that ethnic group.”); see also Hilary N. Weaver, Indigenous Identity:
What Is It and Who Really Has It?, 25 AM. INDIAN Q. 240, 245 (2001) (“[I]dentity can only be
confirmed by those who share that identity.”).
101. Devon A. Mihesuah, American Indian Identities: Issues of Individual Choices and Devel-
opment, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 193, 207–08 (1998).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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adoptees originates in “the apparent and immutable racial and ethnic differ-
ences between parents and children,” and has been appropriately termed the
“transracial adoption paradox.”104
Those Native American youth, who grow up off-reservation with lim-
ited connection to their cultural past, often express their indigenous identity
and cultural pride through resistance to the white community.105For exam-
ple, because academic achievement is important to the white community,
Native American youth often drop out of school as a way of defying the
dominant society.106According to Pierce, “in American Indian societies,
which are collectively oriented . . . rather than individually oriented . . . to
‘not belong’ is a powerfully isolating experience.”107 Feelings of isolation
have been identified as a major predictor of shyness, increased feelings of
alienation, lower social acceptance, anger, and depression among adoles-
cents.108Thus, the inherent danger to indigenous children from transracial
adoption that was identified by Locust may be partially attributed to the
inability of those children to engage tribal life due to inadequate socializa-
tion with other tribal members.
Another problem facing indigenous adoptees is that even if their adop-
tive parents seek to introduce their children to Indian culture, methods typi-
cally employed for doing so are flawed. Ten years ago, Devon Mihesuah
employed David Cross’s work on the process of becoming black (termed
“Cycles of Nigresence”) to identify various elements that influence identity
formation of those claiming to be racially and/or ethnically Native Ameri-
can.109Mihesuah’s work identified a key component for understanding why
104. Lee, supra note 89, at 721; see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 33 n.1 (1989) (“[T]hey were raised with a white cultural and social identity. They are
raised in a white home. They attended predominantly white schools, and in almost all cases,
attended a church that was predominantly white, and really came to understand very little about
Indian culture, Indian behavior, and had virtually no viable Indian identity. They can recall such
things as seeing cowboys and Indians on TV and feeling that Indians were a historical figure but
were not a viable contemporary social group. Then during adolescence, they found that society
was not to grant them the white identity that they had . . . . For example, a universal experience
was that when they began to date white children, the parents of the white youngsters were against
this, and there were pressures among white children from the parents not to date these Indian
children . . . . The other experience was derogatory name calling in relation to their racial identity
. . . . [T]hey were finding that society was putting on them an identity which they didn’t possess
and taking from them an identity that they did possess.” (quoting Indian Child Welfare Program:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
93d Cong. 46 (1974) (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer))).
105. Weaver, supra note 100, at 245.
106. Id.; see also Martin D. Topper, “Mormon Placement”: The Effects of Missionary Foster
Families on Navajo Adolescents, 7 ETHOS 142 (1979). Topper describes other methods that youth
with conflicted ethnic identities resort to in resistance of white enculturation—drinking, hysterics,
pregnancy—which also hinder success within white society.
107. Pierce, supra note 96, at 3.
108. Id.
109. See generally Mihesuah, supra note 101.
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transracial adoption is problematic for indigenous people. In discussing
Cross’s “encounter” stage of identity formation, Mihesuah noted:
Some white parents may attempt to educate the adopted child
about his Indian heritage, but if they know nothing about Indians
they may take the child to general events such as powwows and
movies dealing with Indians, and read them books with Indian
characters.  The lack of depth in any of these activities usually
proves to be unsatisfactory to the child.110
Mihesuah’s suspicion was confirmed by Locust’s pilot study of Indians
who grew up in non-Indian homes.  One of her study’s twenty participants
wrote:
Somebody said we could learn all we needed to learn about our
culture and heritage from books and videos from our school.
What a laugh! What we got was watered down, Indian-style-Ses-
ame-Street version of what some white person thought all Indians
were like.”111
The tendency for whites to oversimplify indigenous culture is not new.
Historically, whites have mistakenly viewed Native American cultures as
static and unchanging. As a result, they believe that Native American cul-
ture can be taught like a history lesson.112For example, whites may assume
that kin-based sharing and reciprocity among Native Americans are ancient
practices existing uninterrupted since the buffalo days, while at least one
scholar claims that the continuing presence of these traits in modern reser-
vation life is actually better attributed to recent adaptations to rural pov-
erty.113 Thus, those adoptive parents who attempt to acculturate their Indian
children by way of textbook or pan-Indian cultural events miss the ever-
changing social aspect of Indianness that is “a property of interaction be-
tween tribal members, tribal resources, community organizations, tribal
land and all the other ‘parts’ of a tribe.”114  Without genuine socialization,
Native American children will inevitably be isolated from those biological
kin who might provide the only reasonably accessible reentry points into
110. Id. at 203.
111. Locust, supra note 92, at 12.
112. See ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY IN THE
COLONIAL CONTEXT 40 (1995) (calling this trope of colonial psychology the “invention of anach-
ronistic space” in which “imperial progress across the space of empire is figured as a journey
backward in time”); see also Peroff, supra note 97, at 485 (“Today, most popular notions of
American Indians and “Indianness” remain locked in the past and stereotyped . . . . They seem
frozen in time in enduring treaty-based relationships to the federal government, as perpetual citi-
zens of ‘domestic dependent nations,’ and as permanent wards of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) and other agencies of the federal government. In television, the movies, and elsewhere in
the media, Indianness seems permanently associated with the American Indian of the old Ameri-
can frontier.”).
113. Thomas Belosi, Review: The American Indian and the Problem of Culture, 13 AM. IN-
DIAN Q. 261, 264 (1989).
114. Peroff, supra note 97, at 487.
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tribal culture and identity. While they may have good intentions for doing
so, adoptive parents who employ such two-dimensional acculturation tech-
niques sometimes fail to remedy the damage done by transracial adoption.
III. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
What ICWA Does
When ICWA language was passed in October of 1978, the Act estab-
lished “a variety of procedural and substantive protections in a child cus-
tody proceeding involving an American-Indian child.”115 The Act
established three separate policies:
(1) [E]stablishment of and adherence to minimum standards in
order to remove Indian children from their families; (2) placement
of Indian children in homes that reflect the unique values of In-
dian culture; and (3) government assistance for child and family
service programs. Through the ICWA, Congress ‘has expressed
its clear preference for keeping Indian children with their fami-
lies, deferring to tribal judgment on matters concerning the cus-
tody of tribal children, and placing Indian children . . .  within
their own families or tribe.’116
In order to carry out these policies, tribes are granted exclusive jurisdiction
over custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled on a reserva-
tion117 and the right to intervene in any foster care placement or termination
of parental rights proceeding.118State authorities are also required to satisfy
a higher evidentiary standard before terminating an Indian’s parental
rights.119 ICWA even mandated that foster care placements prefer Indian
homes over non-Indian homes.120 The Act’s adoptive placement prefer-
ences have been called “the real bite of ICWA” and are especially worth
highlighting for the purposes of this paper.121 ICWA requires that “[i]n any
adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be
given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1)
a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian
115. Thomas R. Myers & Jonathan J. Siebers, The Indian Child Welfare Act: Myths and Mis-
taken Application, MICH. B.J., July 2004, at 19, 19–20; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (1978).
Much has already been written about the specific requirements of ICWA and there is no need to
go into great detail here. For a more thorough examination of ICWA’s provisions, see generally
Michael C. Snyder, An Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 815
(1995).
116. Sloan Philips, The Indian Child Welfare Act in the Face of Extinction, 21 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 351, 354 (1997).
117. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1978).
118. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978).
119. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1978).
120. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1978).
121. Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study in the Codification of the
Ethnic Best Interests of the Child, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 26 (1997).
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child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”122 As a result of the heightened
levels of protection, at a 1980 oversight hearing, the Acting Deputy Com-
missioner of the BIA called ICWA “. . . truly a landmark piece of Indian
legislation.”123
What ICWA Fails To Do
Despite the Act’s success, serious problems remain. One of the largest
remaining problems is created by non-ICWA-compliant child placements
resulting from both voluntary and involuntary proceedings. These place-
ments are brought to light by petitions to finalize the placements through
adoption or other more informal means and are subsequently opposed by
tribal authorities.124 Most often, these cases arise as a result of ignorance of
the law, outright fraud on the part of private adoption agencies and adoption
122. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1978).
123. Oversight of the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 96th Cong. 34 (1980) (statement of Theodore Krenzke, Acting Deputy Comm’r, Bureau
of Indian Affairs).
124. Among its procedural safeguards, ICWA explicitly grants Indian tribes the right to notice
whenever an Indian child is subject to an involuntary proceeding regarding foster care or the
termination of parental rights. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1978). It also grants tribes the right to inter-
vene in any proceeding, voluntary or involuntary, regarding foster care or the termination of pa-
rental rights. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1978).  Because ICWA does not specifically grant a right of
notice for voluntary placements in foster care and voluntary terminations of parental rights, this
creates a problematic “notice gap” in which tribes cannot come to learn about illegal placements
until after they happen. This gap in the notice provision has been partially addressed by state laws
requiring notice in voluntary proceedings—the same method employed by proposed amendments
to ICWA. See generally Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, MINN. STAT.
§§ 260.761–835; Marcia Yablon, The Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 2003, 38 FAM. L.
Q. 689 (2004). For examples of voluntary placements outside of the Act’s preferences, see gener-
ally In re Adoption of B.G.J., 133 P.3d 1, 3 (2006) (finding “good cause” to depart from ICWA’s
placement preferences. Biological mother placed child with adoption agency after informing the
agency that child was eligible for enrollment in Prairie Band Potawatomie Nation. Adoption
agency placed child with non-native foster family who then sought to adopt child against the
wishes of the Tribe.); In re Baby Boy Doe, 902 P.2d 477, 480 (1995) (finding “good cause” to
depart from ICWA’s placement preferences. Non-native biological mother placed child with
adoptive parents shortly after birth. Adoptive parents initiated proceedings to terminate the fa-
ther’s parental rights, but the father’s Indian tribe intervened and sought application of ICWA.); In
re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (1988) (finding ICWA was inapplicable when biological
mother placed child with non-native friends who had previously visited reservation.  Tribe sought
to have court proceedings transferred to tribal court.); and In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925
(1993) (finding ICWA was applicable when biological mother had no contact with Native biologi-
cal father during pregnancy and placed child for adoption shortly after birth. Biological mother
informed agency of father’s native ancestry but chose a non-native family for adoption. Adoptive
parents sought termination of father’s parental rights and father’s tribe intervened.). For an exam-
ple of government-sponsored placement outside of the ICWA preferences after involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights, see In re Adoption of Sara J., 123 P.3d 1017 (Alaska 2005) (finding
“good cause” to depart from ICWA’s placement preferences. Following termination of parental
rights, Alaska Office of Children’s Services placed child with non-native woman who lived in
close proximity to the hospital where child needed regular medical attention. The woman sought
to adopt the child, as did the maternal aunt and uncle. The child’s tribe intervened and opposed the
woman’s petition to adopt.).
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attorneys, or as a result of informal arrangements between a Native parent
and non-Native foster parents of which the tribe has no knowledge.125Even
worse, state courts often sign off on these illegal adoptions and “fail to
realize that the voluntary acts of the Indian parents cannot unilaterally de-
termine application of the Act and/or placement of the Indian children, to
the exclusion of the right of the tribe to have a voice in child custody pro-
ceedings involving its children.”126 As a result, tribes appeal these decisions
and custody of Indian children remains in question for an uncomfortably
long period of time. The children subjected to these actions become increas-
ingly bonded to their foster parents, and a court-ordered separation becomes
all the more painful for everyone involved.127
State Court Resistance to ICWA
Appellate court judges, hesitant to remove a child from the adoptive
parents the child has become attached to, have devised ways to avoid en-
forcement of the Act. Often, judges exploit the “good cause” provision
within the adoptive placement preferences to avoid separating children from
their adoptive families. The term “good cause” is undefined in ICWA—
leaving state courts to define it as they see fit.128 While ICWA was de-
signed to limit the abuses of state courts, the “good cause” provision gives
judges in most states plenty of room to avoid enforcement of the Act’s
preferences.129 In fact, within six years of ICWA’s passage, complaints
were already being made to the Senate’s ICWA oversight committee claim-
ing that “[s]tate court judges are having a field day with the language ‘good
cause to the contrary’ . . . . Out of 200 cases that we have handled in the last
fifteen months, this has been an issue in over half.”130Unfortunately, this
trend of abusing “good cause” has continued and, more often than not,
judges find “good cause” not to enforce the Act.131
125. Because of the problems with dishonest behavior on the part of adoption workers and
attorneys, proposed amendments to ICWA would have made it a criminal offense to fraudulently
or knowingly misrepresent the Native American status of any child. See S. 569 & H.R. 1082,
105th Cong. (1997).
126. Metteer, supra note 23, at 461 (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 50 (1989)).
127. 143 CONG. REC. S3120 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1997) (statement of Sen. John McCain)
(“Nonetheless, particularly in the voluntary adoption context, there have been occasional high-
profile cases which have resulted in lengthy, protracted litigation causing great anguish for chil-
dren, their adoptive families, their birth families, and their Indian tribes.”).
128. See Aamot-Snapp, supra note 15, at 1178–79.
129. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978) (“[Congress finds] that the States, exercising their recog-
nized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bod-
ies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural
and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”).
130. Oversight of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 98th Cong. 158, 162 (1984) (statement of Eric Eberhard).
131. For recent cases finding “good cause,” see In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska
1993); In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz.
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On top of “good cause” abuses, ICWA has been subverted by a judi-
cially-made exception to the Act—the “existing Indian family” doctrine.
The “existing Indian family” doctrine was first created in 1982 when the
Kansas Supreme Court refused to apply ICWA to an illegitimate Indian
child who was placed for adoption immediately after birth by his non-Na-
tive mother.132The court based its reasoning upon a section of the expressed
policy of the Act, but took it out of context. Where Congress stated that “it
is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian chil-
dren from their families . . .”133, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that
those children who were never part of an “existing Indian family” did not fit
the definition of “Indian child” and therefore the Act did not apply to
them.134
Courts that employ the “existing Indian family” doctrine generally em-
ploy a “minimum contacts” analysis to determine whether or not the child
has sufficient ties to his or her tribe for the Act to apply.135Of course, the
great irony of the “existing Indian family” doctrine is that ICWA was de-
signed to ensure the continuation of threatened Native American culture. By
withholding the Act’s application from those whose Indian identity is mar-
ginal, the doctrine denies protection to those who need it most. Although
the “existing Indian family” doctrine puts power back into the hands of
state court judges, seven states currently embrace the doctrine: Alabama,
Indiana, Kentucky, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennes-
see.136Seventeen states have rejected the “existing Indian family” doctrine
by statute or case law137 and the last state to embrace the doctrine was
1983); Fresno County Dep’t of Children and Family Serv. v. Super. Ct., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 155
(2004); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 959 So.2d 761, 764 (Fla.
2007); In re Baby Boy Doe, 902 P.2d 477 (Idaho 1995); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d
298, 311 (Ind. 1988); In re Adoption of B.G.J., 111 P.3d 651, (Kan. 2005); and In re Adoption of
M., 832 P.2d 518 (Wash. 1992).  For appellate cases finding insufficient “good cause,” see In re
Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994) and In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510
(Mont. 1996).
132. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 172 (Kan. 1982).
133. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
134. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
135. Metteer, supra note 23, at 430.
136. Memorandum from Meika Vogel, Summer Associate, Faegre and Benson LLP, to Betsy
Schmiesing, Partner, Faegre and Benson LLP, Existing Indian Family Exception 3 (July 3, 2008)
(on file with ICWA Law Center) (citing S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So.2d 1187 (Ala. 1990); In re Adop-
tion of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996); Hamp-
ton v. J.A.L., 658 So.2d 331 (La. 1995); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1986); In re Morgan,
No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. 1997)).
137. Id. at 4–5 (citing D.S. v. County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991); In
re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989); Michael J., Jr. v. Michael J., Sr., 7 P.3d 960
(Ariz. 2000); In re N.B., No. 06CA1325, 2007 Colo. App. LEXIS 1758 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007);
Indian Tribe v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993); Tubridy v. Iron Bear (In re
Adoption of S.S.), 622 N.E.2d 832 (Ill. 1993); In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 2005); IOWA
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Tennessee in 1997.138While it is comforting that the spread of the “existing
Indian family” doctrine appears to have stalled, its continued existence,
combined with the prevalence of “good cause” determinations, is dangerous
for Indian families—especially in states where the doctrine is viable.
IV. CONTACT AGREEMENTS
Contact agreements were developed to help facilitate an increasing in-
terest in open adoption.139 While adoption was once viewed as “a discrete
legal event dissolving one family and creating another, [it] is now recog-
nized as a dynamic lifelong process affecting those involved in different
ways.”140 State legislatures have responded to this change by modifying
adoption law so that it “increasingly provides for a continuum of adoption,
with closed adoption on one end and ongoing contact between adoptive and
birth families, usually in the form of cooperative adoption, on the other.”141
In order to facilitate the ongoing contact, many states now recognize post-
adoption contact agreements as legally binding which gives signatories con-
tinuing rights to contact with adoptees.142
Contact agreements have only recently begun to be incorporated into
Indian child welfare situations. In fact, two of the most famous ICWA cases
to date resulted in continuing contact between Native American adoptees
and their biological family after adoption. In re Adoption of Halloway,143
which the Supreme Court called “a leading case on the ICWA,”144 was
resolved in tribal court when a Mormon couple who had had custody of an
Indian child for over five years were awarded permanent guardianship.145In
return, the couple agreed to maintain contact between the child and his Nav-
ajo mother at least until the child reached the age of thirteen.146At that
point, the child could decide for himself whether to maintain contact with
his mother and tribe.147Likewise, Holyfield, the only ICWA case the U.S.
Supreme Court has heard, resulted in a Choctaw tribal court arrangement
CODE § 232B.5(2) (2007); In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. 1996); MINN. STAT. § 260.771(2)
(2007); In re Adoption of Riffle, 922 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1996); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian
Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005);
Hoots v. R.B. (In re A.B.), 663 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 2003); In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099
(Okla. 2004); Quinn v. Walters, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. 1994); In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d
485 (S.D. 1990); State ex rel. D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993 (Utah 1997); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 13.34.040(3), 26.10.034(1), 26.33.040(1) (2004)).
138. In re Morgan, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. 1997).
139. Appell, supra note 20, at 24.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
144. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52 (1989).
145. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 664, n.311 (2002).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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under which the twins subject to the dispute were ordered to reside perma-
nently with their adoptive parent but were to maintain regular contact with
their birth family and tribe.148Arrangements like these were also contem-
plated in a set of proposed amendments to ICWA in 2001, which, if they
had been passed, would have authorized state courts to approve post-adop-
tion visitation agreements as part of an adoption decree if such an agree-
ment was in the best interests of the child.149
Proponents of open adoption believe that it can benefit adoptees in
their identity development by allowing adoptees to integrate birth relation-
ships or knowledge about those relationships into their developmental pro-
cess.150This claim has been supported by a study of 1,396 adoptions of
children from infants to sixteen-year-olds, which found that children in
open adoptions had significantly better behavior scores than children in
adoptions with no access to birthparents, and that the adoptive parents of
children who were in contact with birthparents had more positive impres-
sions of those birthparents.151Yet, as applied to the settlement of contested
adoptions arising under ICWA, there are several reasons to doubt the touted
benefits of open adoption as enforced by contact agreements.
The Case Against Contact Agreements
Empirical evidence suggests that the specific circumstances of con-
tested ICWA adoptions would curtail any benefits derived from contact
agreements that might be otherwise available in open adoption scenarios.
Marianne Berry found that the key predictor of adoptive parents’ comfort
with open adoption was whether parents had planned for openness from the
beginning of the placement.152 Where biological and adoptive parents are
litigating for complete control over a child’s custody, this essential factor is
missing.153
148. Id. at 664.
149. Id. at 668 (citing Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 2001, H.R. Res. 2644, 107th
Cong. (2001)).
150. Appell, supra note 20, at 24.
151. Marianne Berry, Risks and Benefits of Open Adoption, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring
1993, at 125, 133.
152. Id. at 132 (citing Marianne Berry, Adoptive Parents’ Perceptions of, and Comfort with,
Open Adoption, 72 CHILD WELFARE 231 (1993)).
153. It is also true that mediating custody disputes can result in more frequent contact between
non-custodial parents and their biological children and greater involvement in the decision-making
process from both of them; however, research evidencing these benefits is based on procedural
norms distinct from contested ICWA adoptions. When University of Virginia researchers discov-
ered that parties to a custody battle experienced better long-term results when they mediated rather
than litigated their disputes, the researchers assigned the parties to a mediation or litigation re-
search group as soon as they had petitioned a Virginia court for a child custody hearing. It is likely
that these benefits would not extend to situations where hostility and bitterness had already accu-
mulated from litigation before negotiating with Indian tribes had began. See generally Robert E.
Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Custody, Contact, and Coparenting 12
Years After Initial Dispute Resolution, 69 J.  COUNSELING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323 (2001).
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Whatever the empirical and theoretical evidence says about the utility
of contact agreements, conditions are ripe for continued abuse of ICWA and
allowing contact agreements to supplant adoption within the Act’s prefer-
ences creates another venue in which that abuse can occur. The number of
parents interested in adoption grossly outnumbers the number of children
available for adoption. Approximately fifty-one thousand children born in
the United States each year are placed for adoption.154 However, there are
approximately one million parents in the United States strongly interested
in adoption and over two hundred fifty thousand prospective parents that
have taken concrete steps towards adoption.155 The elevated levels of de-
mand for adoptable children create a considerable financial incentive for
adoption agencies to satisfy couples’ desire to adopt, even if that means
violating ICWA’s preferences.156Native American children continue to be
grossly overrepresented in the foster care system.157The combination of
these factors forces Native American children into a perilous position
within the economy of adoption. Both demand and supply for these children
is high, and the only obstacle to equilibrium is one significantly disfavored
federal law. At this point, one must recognize that “power is at its peak
when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences . . .”158 Until the demand
for adoptable children decreases, and so long as state courts have the ten-
dency to “reward those who obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise,
and maintain it during any ensuing (and protracted) litigation,” Native
American children are in danger of losing their cultural heritage to market
pressures.159
There are several reasons to believe that assimilationist attitudes are
still alive and affecting Native American children, which, if nothing else,
should arouse skepticism about any policy that facilitates avoidance of the
Act’s adoptive preferences.  While government-sponsored assimilationist
policies have ended, the United States recently refused to sign the United
Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—a document de-
claring in part that “indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to
be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.”160 This
should not be surprising given the continued “otherness” of Indian cultures
within mainstream America. Assimilationist policies were founded on,
154. Neil Terry, Nancy Turner, & Jennifer Falkner, Comparing the Efficacy of Domestic Ver-
sus International Child Adoption, 33 SW. ECON. REV. 95, 99 (2006).
155. Id.
156. See Robert Lindsey, Adoption Market: Big Demand, Tight Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
1987, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE6D61F30F936A3575
7C0A961948260.
157. GAO, supra note 79.
158. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreward: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 68 (1987).
159. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986).
160. U.N. Human Rights Council, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, art. 8, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
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among other things, the desire to bring Native Americans within the ac-
cepted, capitalist economic structure of the white majority.161Many Native
Americans remain outside that model today. American Indians and Alaska
Natives participate in the labor force at a substantially lower rate than the
total population.162 In 1999, more than twice as many American Indians
and Alaska Natives lived below the official poverty level as the rest of the
population.163This is especially troubling given that several states base a
determination of “good cause” to depart from the Act’s adoptive prefer-
ences upon a judicially-determined, “best interests” analysis,164 which “re-
quires a subjective evaluation of a multitude of factors, many, if not all of
which are imbued with the values of majority culture.”165It is critical to
note two overarching principles: paternalism inspired the Indian boarding
school movement and the misguided social workers who damaged so many
lives, and paternalism can be just as damaging when it is done in hopes of
giving an Indian child “greater opportunities” in a white home.
Lastly, it is highly unlikely that contact agreements will facilitate the
kind of intensive socialization with the biological family and other tribal
members necessary for Indian children to develop a healthy and integrated
sense of their bicultural identity. A long-term study of 231 foster care adop-
tions revealed that the mean number of contacts between biological and
adoptive families within open adoptions (including telephone calls and let-
ters) was only three per year.166 It is very doubtful that this kind of limited
contact can achieve proper socialization among Native American adoptees.
Even if parties were to negotiate for more frequent contact, adoptive fami-
lies within mainstream culture may have little appreciation for their child’s
dire need for bicultural socialization and thereby lack the motivation neces-
sary to ensure that contact happens. As one scholar notes, “Anglo Ameri-
cans feel no corresponding urgency to safeguard and cultivate their
children’s bonds with their culture because the traditions of Anglo culture
permeate majoritarian society in a way that Native values and traditions
clearly do not.”167 If adoptive parents fail to keep their obligations under a
contact agreement, enforcement can be a real problem.168 In Minnesota, for
161. HOXIE, supra note 42, at 240.
162. Id. at 11.
163. STELLA U. OGUNWOLE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND
ALASKA NATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2006).
164. See In re Interest of Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d 785 (Neb. 1983); In re Appeal in Maricopa
County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz. 1983); In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863 (Okla.
1988).
165. In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 363 (1994).
166. Karie M. Frasch, Devon Brooks, & Richard P. Barth, Openness and Contact in Foster
Care Adoptions: An Eight-Year Follow-Up, 49 FAM. REL. 435, 439 (Oct. 2000).
167. Aamot-Snapp, supra note 15, at 1179.
168. Appell, supra note 20, at 35 (“One of the most difficult issues implicating adoption with
contact is the proper response when the agreement is no longer working for one or more of the
parties.”).
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example, Indian tribes and extended family members—who are an essential
part of Indian family relations—have no statutory authority to enter into or
enforce contact agreements.169In light of the foregoing reasons, it appears
that any benefits from open adoption enforced by contact agreements would
fail to help Native American children in contested adoptions.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which an open adoption enforced
by a contact agreement could supplant adoption within the preferences of
ICWA without threatening an Indian child’s wellbeing. Although risky to
do so considering the already precarious position of Indian children, in the
interests of facilitating compromise, there are five principles that should
make for a successful contact agreement. First and most important, any dis-
cussions about contact agreements and deviation from ICWA’s preferences
should be initiated well before litigation is even considered and should be
as inclusive and hospitable to extended family and other tribal members as
possible. Second, the custody and visitation terms of the contact agreement
should not be depended upon to initiate new relationships. A functional
contact agreement would have no grand pretensions of generating commu-
nication between an Indian child and the relatives when his adoptive parents
had never made an effort to contact him or her in the years before an agree-
ment was reached. Third, the adoptive family should live within an easy
commute from the adoptee’s relatives and tribe. Bridging the divide be-
tween mainstream and Native culture will not be easy, and a fourteen-hour
drive to see relatives will not make it any easier.  Fourth, contact agree-
ments should only be entered into in jurisdictions in which they are legally
enforceable. Lastly, while pan-Indian cultural events like powwows are im-
portant, adoptive parents must recognize that these events can never replace
intimate relationships with other Native Americans in developing a child’s
Indian identity.
Indeed, it would be far better if ICWA were enforced in the first place.
By requiring foster care placements to conform with preferences very simi-
169. This is true unless the extended family members have lived with the child previously or
have adopted the child previously. See In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah
1986); see also MINN. STAT. § 259.58 (1997) (“Adoptive parents and a birth relative or foster
parents may enter an agreement regarding communication with or contact between an adopted
minor, adoptive parents, and a birth relative or foster parents under this section. An agreement
may be entered between: (1) adoptive parents and a birth parent; (2) adoptive parents and any
other birth relative or foster parent with whom the child resided before being adopted; or (3)
adoptive parents and any other birth relative if the child is adopted by a birth relative upon the
death of both birth parents. For purposes of this section, ‘birth relative’ means a parent, stepparent,
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, or aunt of a minor adoptee. This relationship may be by blood,
adoption, or marriage. For an Indian child, birth relative includes members of the extended family
as defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of laws or custom,
nieces, nephews, or first or second cousins, as provided in the Indian Child Welfare Act, United
States Code, title 25, section 1903.”).
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lar to adoptive preferences, ICWA lends itself toward desirable outcomes
from the outset.170However, when adoption agencies and social workers fail
to appreciate the ICWA, or worse yet, intentionally suppress the Indian
identity of a child in hopes of avoiding the Act, ICWA also grants tribes
substantial power to fight illicit placements. It is unfair to ask tribes to re-
frain from opposing adoptions outside of ICWA’s preferences when their
survival depends on the cultural awareness of their children. It is also un-
realistic to expect judges to put a stop to such adoptions when doing so
would mean that a judge is the one to pull children away from recognizable
families within their own communities and deliver them to people with
whom the judge is unfamiliar and maybe even hostile. If Indian foster chil-
dren are going to survive the heightened demand for adoptees, ICWA must
be followed early on in a child’s life and applied consistently across juris-
dictions. In order for this to happen, child welfare workers must be edu-
cated to understand that ICWA is a narrowly-tailored law that makes a
thoughtful, well-reasoned determination of what is in the best interests of
Indian children.
It is too early to know how Christian Good Bird will adjust to growing
up in rural Minnesota, five hundred miles from his tribe’s reservation.
Christian’s adoptive parents promised “to establish and maintain contact
with [Christian’s] Tribal culture and his extended family.”171 Hopefully, the
Hofers understand that Christian’s “Tribal culture” and his extended family
are one and the same and that real socialization with fellow tribal members
is far and away the best tool to help him overcome the challenges he will
face in developing his cultural identity.  Since the Three Affiliated Tribes
have no standing to enforce such a contract in Minnesota,172 it is up to the
Hofers to determine whether conceding to Christian’s adoption meant say-
ing goodbye for now or goodbye forever.
170. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1978) (“Any child accepted for foster care or preadoptive place-
ment shall be placed in the least restrictive setting which most approximates a family and in which
his special needs, if any, may be met. The child shall also be placed within reasonable proximity
to his or her home, taking into account any special needs of the child. In any foster care or
preadoptive placement, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary,
to a placement with (i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family; (ii) a foster home li-
censed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s tribe; (iii) an Indian foster home licensed or
approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or (iv) an institution for children ap-
proved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to
meet the Indian child’s needs.”).
171. Cultural Connectedness Agreement, supra note 5.
172. MINN. STAT. § 259.58 (1997).
\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-1\UST113.txt unknown Seq: 27 15-JUN-09 12:41
296 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:1
